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WHAT IS SCIENCE- ENGAGED 
THEOLOGY?
JOHN PERRY and JOANNA LEIDENHAG
Is there a journal less likely than Modern Theology to devote a special issue to the natural 
sciences? When we were in grad school, we would have said, “No and I hope they 
never descend to that. You see, Modern Theology does real theology.” Real theology, we 
thought, should always be queen of the sciences. We had picked up the fads of our gen-
eration, and one such fad was the idea that whenever scientists were invited to the 
theological table, then theology would automatically assume a subservient position. 
But then we came across Kenneth Surin’s founding editorial in Modern Theology that 
promised to study “theology in relation to history and culture . . . and the natural and 
social sciences.”1 How did this square with the rest of the journal’s bold vision?
We were not able to piece it together until later. What we were picking up on, 
however— without quite sensing the significance— was theology’s “new boldness.”2 
That was Kathryn Tanner’s phrase in her essay reflecting on Modern Theology’s first 
twenty- five years. Tanner was not alone. In the twenty- fifth anniversary issue of the 
journal, several former editors and current editorial board members recounted some 
version of the same outlook. No longer were theology’s options constrained by moder-
nity; it was time to proclaim a pox on both houses— those too ready to culturally accom-
modate and those too ready to culturally repudiate.
What should replace the tired options of modernity varies, depending on whom 
you ask. For George Lindbeck, theology should be understood as a cultural- linguistic 
grammar— because the old options, which looked like opposites (experiential- 
expressivist and cognitive- propositionalist), were in fact fighting on the same side. 
For Stanley Hauerwas, theology should take the form of ecclesial practices of resident 
alien Christians— because the old options, which looked like opposites (Democrats and 
Republicans), were in fact members of the same family squabbling over who had ju-
risdiction of the kitchen. For Kenneth Surin, theology was defined as whatever would 
1 Kenneth Surin, “Editorial,” Modern Theology 1, no.1 (October 1984): 2.
2 Kathryn Tanner, “Shifts in Theology over the Last Quarter Century,” Modern Theology 26, no. 1 (January 
2010): 39.
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help young scholars combat Margaret Thatcher’s neoliberal blitzkrieg (his word)— 
because the old options, which looked like opposites (Schleiermachian accommodators 
and Barthian repudiators), were in fact embroiled in a civil war fighting with the same 
weapons. But perhaps the leading champion of theology’s new boldness in the pages 
of Modern Theology has been Radical Orthodoxy, which challenges the dominance of the 
social and natural sciences, with their pretense of neutral rationality, as characteristic of 
modernity’s eclipse of theology.
Given that “new boldness” has been a signature trademark of Modern Theology from 
its inception, one might think that a special science issue such as this one is out of place. 
It might, that is, until one considers the publication of Peter Harrison’s Gifford Lectures, 
The Territories of Science and Religion (2015).
Harrison’s ostensible argument in Territories debunks the long- standing conflict the-
sis propagated by John William Draper and Andrew Dickson White according to which 
“Religion” and “Science” are locked in inevitable battle, an assumption grounded in the 
premise that the Bible is meant to be read literally and, by that logic, Christians are com-
mitted to the proposition that God created the world 6000 years ago, that the sun re-
volves around the earth, and so on.3 Historians of science have long known that Galileo’s 
and Darwin’s stories are more complicated than this caricature. Nonetheless, the con-
flict thesis persists in certain circles (e.g., Richard Dawkins’s Twitter account). Harrison’s 
argument, however, explores the conflict thesis further and has fascinating implications 
for theology.
Imagine, Harrison says, that you hear about a battle fought in the middle ages be-
tween Israel and Egypt. The stories must be false since those countries did not exist in 
the middle ages.4 If someone defends the veracity of these stories by saying, “On the 
contrary, the pyramids and the Second Temple ruins did exist back then,” it would not 
help their case, because even if an army from the pyramids attacked an army from the 
Temple ruins, naming those armed forces the Egyptian and Israeli armies would be 
profoundly misleading. So goes Harrison’s argument. “Science” and “Religion” could 
not possibly be in conflict until the nineteenth century at the earliest, because, until 
then, their definitions as distinct entities had not yet been developed. Even if there were 
battles between forces that bore similarities to post- Darwin “Science” and post- 
Christendom “Religion,” the anachronism of those terms greatly confuses the matter. 
What Harrison’s argument offers theologians is a language with which to rethink how 
our senses, and the tools extending and systematizing them, count as a legitimately 
theological source— because the old options, which looked like opposing and mutually 
exclusive positions (e.g. Ian Barbour’s typology of conflict, independence, dialogue) in 
fact occupy the same territory.
In recent years, two streams of thought within academic theology have developed 
which take their cues from Harrison. The first, mostly made up of senior scholars, is 
associated with the major players of Radical Orthodoxy (John Milbank, Simon Oliver, 
Catherine Pickstock, et al.) but headed by Paul Tyson, a younger colleague of Harrison 
himself. The second is associated with a series of research grants based at the University 
of St Andrews. Among other endeavors, this second stream led to the creation of this 
special issue, to which we invited primarily junior scholars to contribute.
3 John William Draper, History of the Conflict between Religion and Science (1875); Andrew Dickson White, 
A History of the Warfare of Science with Theology in Christendom, 2 vols. (1897).
4 Peter Harrison, The Territories of Science and Religion (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2015), 1.
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In identifying what these two streams share, we cannot do better than Tyson:
The present literature on science and religion tends to be dominated by three 
genres: a conflict genre, according to which science and religion are locked into a 
relationship of perennial opposition; a disentangling genre in which science does 
one sort of thing and religion does another; and a synthetic genre. . . . While on the 
face of it these approaches could hardly be more divergent, in fact they share a 
common commitment to the idea that "science" and "religion" are valid, trans- 
historical categories that capture more or less perennial features of human culture. 
If it is true that science and religion, albeit in various guises, have been the chief 
lenses through which the world has been interpreted, then posing the question of 
how they relate to each other makes good sense. But what if it is not true?5
Indeed, to put it more positively, what if Harrison’s thesis is right? What if the modern 
sense of “Religion” is underdetermined and the modern sense of “Science” is far too gen-
eral to be helpful?6
How can Harrison’s conclusions be incorporated into a new iteration of theological 
thought? One idea is that “we can initiate a much more fruitful discussion if we begin 
by questioning these two basic categories [Science and Religion] that frame and delimit 
the current conversation about how to interpret the world,” as Tyson’s project sets out 
to do.7 In other words, we can get to the bottom of the stories in which those terms have 
their purchase by focusing on narrative— i.e., by recounting moments at which the 
boundaries of each were in flux (e.g., should natural philosophy count as science? 
should magic and alchemy count as religion?). This is a promising way of using history 
to continually destabilize modernity’s disciplinary boundaries, highlighting the ways 
in which scientific theories are already engaged in metaphysical and theological de-
bates and that scientific inquiry can be a form of spiritual devotion. Call this approach 
theology- engaged science.8
A second idea, what this special issue sets out to do, is to study narrowly- focused 
theological questions that are already entangled with scientific theories and findings. 
We call this, inversely, science- engaged theology.
Science- engaged theology identifies where theologians are already employing or pre-
suming a certain picture of the empirical world, whether they consciously acknowledge 
it or not. Almost all the contributors in this special issue have identified an unacknowl-
edged or underacknowledged concept within current theological debate that is already 
entangled in empirical claims (e.g., Massmann on the notion of gift, Leidenhag on the 
concept of purpose, Whelan on natural order, and Zahl on the idea of social relational-
ity). We call such entangled questions theological puzzles. We hope that by bringing these 
puzzles to light theologians will be able to move more slowly in both critical and 
5 Paul Tyson, “Introduction: After Science and Religion?,” in After Science and Religion, eds. Peter Harrison, 
John Milbank and Paul Tyson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).
6 What Harrison says about religio and scientia bears a close analogical relation to what Bill Cavanaugh 
argued years ago about religio and status in the so- called wars of religion. See William T. Cavanaugh, “‘A Fire 
Strong Enough to Consume the House’: The Wars of Religion and the Rise of the Nation State,” Modern 
Theology 11, no. 4 (October 1995): 397- 420.
7 Paul Tyson, “Introduction.”
8 See Peter Harrison, “Conclusion,” in After Science and Religion eds. Peter Harrison, John Milbank and 
Paul Tyson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).
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constructive engagement with the relevant area of empirical research. As Alvin Plantinga 
writes, “The world as God created it is full of contingencies. Therefore we do not merely 
think about it in our armchairs, trying to infer from first principles how many teeth 
there are in a horse’s mouth; instead we take a look.”9 This could well serve as a motto 
of this special issue.
By invoking Plantinga here, it might appear that we are endorsing the view that theo-
logians must “submit their claims to the new tribunal of ‘the scientific method.’”10 This 
is not what we intend for science- engaged theology, for at least three reasons. First, this 
would be to abandon the “new boldness” of theology, about which Tanner writes, and 
risk collapsing theology into religious studies. The boldness of science- engaged theol-
ogy, far from being fragile and defensive, is confident enough to go to natural scientists 
with empirical questions from whom they seek to learn and receive. Second, this scien-
tistic picture of theologians waiting for scraps from the scientists’ table assumes that 
theological ideas and scientific findings are easily disentangled or that disciplines exist 
in hermetically sealed bubbles, akin to the way different university departments some-
times occupy separate floors of the same building— living in close proximity to one 
another but rarely interacting. Scientific findings, no less than doctrinal expression, 
both presume and require interpretation. As such, and third, this picture gives the false 
impression of science as an authority over theology. Rather, we think the natural sciences 
are better conceived of as a source for theology alongside Scripture, tradition, reason and 
experience. Indeed, the natural sciences might be thought of within the source of expe-
rience, albeit a type of experience that is interpreted (like Scripture), constrained by a 
standardized method of public enquiry (like reason), and subject to falsification and 
amendment (as a kind of tradition).
But how different is our focus on theological puzzles from the usual suspects studied 
within the so- called “Science and Religion” debate— e.g., arguments for the existence of 
God, the reality of an immaterial soul, Darwinian evolution, and special divine action? 
An overreliance on these stock examples, which serve as archetypes, has plagued the 
intersection of Christian theology and natural science for far too long. This line of in-
quiry has proven to be a trap to the extent that it has supplied the hooks (conflict or 
harmony or nonoverlapping magisteria) upon which to hang the false narrative. 
Consequently, most of us are at pains to imagine how to think about these stock exam-
ples apart from relying on “Science” and “Religion” as “trans- historical categories.”11 
This means that we must, on occasion, keep the grand methodological questions of 
what separates “Religion” and “Science” in the background. We do this not because 
method is unimportant, but because method and content always go hand- in- hand. 
Oftentimes a method will open- up new roads of inquiry. But when this leads to a dead 
end, then we must ask new types of questions and reflect upon methodology after-
wards. Perhaps if we study different examples, a different narrative will emerge. 
Hopefully so. At least, it will be worth finding out.
In addition to new puzzles, a few of our contributors reflect on the methodological 
aspect of their investigations. Where this happens, a surprising conformity appears. 
Their methodology is more often than not driven by theological doctrine or commit-
ments rather than either philosophical or scientific insights (e.g., Tanton’s use of the 
9 Alvin Plantinga, “Methodological Naturalism?,” Origins and Design 18 (1997). Online: https://www.arn.
org/docs/odesi gn/od181/ methn at181.htm.
10 Tyson, “Introduction.”
11 Tyson, “Introduction.”
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doctrine of divine accommodation; Zahl’s excursus on psychological and biblical stud-
ies). Independent of that, a wide variety of schools of theological thought is also rep-
resented among our authors— ranging from an association with Radical Orthodoxy 
(Davison), to dialogue with partners in analytic theology (Visala), to contributions from 
scholars of Barth (Massmann) to Aquinas (Whelan).
In this issue, we have collected eleven different examples, none of which assume 
that “Science” and “Religion” are trans- historical categories. Instead, the articles ex-
emplify how theologians can employ scientific theories and findings in constructive 
and concrete theological debates, while acknowledging that the concepts, ideas, and 
interpretations currently offered by natural science are already laden with theological 
influences and philosophical assumptions. The opening sentence from our first contrib-
utor, Andrew Davison, sets the tone for many of the articles that follow: “Theologians 
are used to thinking about how words stretch across different uses, not least across the 
widest of all differences, between creature and creator.” Davison’s article is about anal-
ogy, so it is hardly surprising that it concerns the ways in which words or concepts are 
entangled. (In this context, we mean words whose meanings derive from multiple fields 
of inquiry in ways that cannot be fully understood without considering all of these dis-
ciplinary approaches.)
Theologians are used to this. For example, first- year students of Aquinas learn that 
diets and dogs can be healthy, but not in the same sense. Unfortunately, as Davison 
observes, not every scholar gets the point. Among scientists, some who appear to need 
it most know it least. For example, when computer scientists say, “My AI system learns 
. . . thinks . . . remembers,” are they appreciating what medieval theologians would call 
the problem of univocity, equivocity, and analogy? Not quite. At least, that is Davison’s 
starting point. He introduces a way to understand analogical predication, mostly via 
Aquinas, Cajetan and Suárez. Some distinctions only come to light when we have an-
other example of analogy like AI systems to add to the one that theologians know best— 
namely, creature and creator. It is worth noting that Davison’s article straddles the two 
post- Harrison streams, theology- engaged science and science- engaged theology, which 
makes sense given the origin stories of each recounted above: in the past, Davison has 
been involved with both the St Andrews project and projects within Radical Orthodoxy.
Similar observations are made throughout a number of later articles in this issue 
concerning words or concepts that, as Davison puts it, stretch across different uses. 
Sometimes, in order to understand the various uses, you need to be acquainted with 
some scientific subdisciplines; sometimes you need to be an expert. If the Vatican 
teaches that “only bread with gluten is consecratable” or “only males are ordainable” 
(as it does), then at the very least the terms “bread”, “gluten”, and “male” are entangled 
concepts: not to be fully understood apart from learning at least some sacramental the-
ology and biology. Our second article asks such a question about the word “remember.”
As theologian Joshua Cockayne and psychologist Gideon Salter write, Israel is com-
manded to remember enslavement and the church is commanded to remember Jesus. But 
they ask, how might the command to remember be obeyed, particularly as no one alive 
today was present at the original events? There are multiple ways to remember. Is re-
membrance recollection or reminiscing? Moreover, is it the sort of thing you can do as a 
group, such as appears to occur in liturgy? Using psychological studies, Cockayne and 
Salter introduce the concepts of episodic memory, mental time travel, and procedural 
memory to help elucidate what the Bible and church tradition might have had in mind.
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One of the ways to interpret the Cockayne and Salter article is to see liturgies as “tech-
nologies” for spiritual formation. Sarah Lane Ritchie offers a similar insight. She begins 
her article by asking, “Why do some people effortlessly experience God and others do 
not, no matter how much they may desire to?”— essentially restating the problem of 
divine hiddenness, but with a twist. Suppose, as seems increasingly likely, that human 
brains are so malleable that whether God remains hidden to you is variable according to 
effort and practice, and thus is, in some sense, amenable to human control. With the aid 
of scholars working in the cognitive sciences, she argues for the theological coherence 
of prayer, fasting, music and other liturgical acts as “spiritual technologies” that can be 
employed in faith to pursue a theological belief.
Following the section on Technology is a section on Humans. Here, Tobias Tanton 
studies the doctrine of divine accommodation. If, as the doctrine holds, God adapts 
God’s words and actions to be understandable to humans, we need to know what hu-
mans are capable of understanding. Or maybe better, how do humans understand? One 
recent answer from embodied cognition, a paradigm in the field of cognitive science, 
is the conceptualization hypothesis, which suggests that human concepts and symbols 
are grounded in sensorimotor states. Tanton uses Athanasius’ De Incarnatione to argue 
that this does not make all human concepts of God prima facie idolatrous. His argument 
provides at least one way to begin to answer the question about divine accommodation. 
There may be other viable starting points, but Tanton’s avoids the accommodation of 
the ex post facto kind espoused by Justin Martyr, who deployed it to circumvent appar-
ent contradictions by saying, in effect, “Oh, God only said that because if God tells it like 
it is, we would get the wrong idea.” This sounds less like divine accommodation and 
more like theological “retconning”— the literary device of retroactive continuity used 
primarily in science- fiction. Instead, Tanton argues, we can give a more comprehensive 
account of the incarnation if we understand it epistemologically.
Simeon Zahl’s central argument is similar to Tanton’s, except his target is the doctrine 
of justification. In his article, he argues against the “individualism vs. communalism 
trope” prevalent in Pauline studies. Zahl points out that social relationality— according 
to scientists in the field of social cognition— does not work like the trope imagines it. 
Zahl’s essay is a good example of how constructive systematic theology, engaging with 
Susan Eastman’s Paul and the Person, can draw on historical- critical study of the New 
Testament and social psychology.
Aku Visala takes a somewhat different approach from the others in this section. He 
starts with findings in recent cognitive sciences on the topic of free will and works his 
way back to theological sources to show that what theologians think of as “the debate 
about free will” is, in fact, an assemblage of many separate questions that the tradi-
tion, perhaps ill- advisedly, has bundled together. He points to examples of theologians 
whose work has engaged free will debate carefully, such as Augustine scholar Jesse 
Couenhoven, as well as those, like Martin Luther, who handle the subject rather less 
carefully. What we see clearly in both Zahl’s and Visala’s essays is how engagements 
with relevant areas of scientific research do not automatically settle theological debates 
or provide clear- cut answers, but rather how they can be used to help reveal false di-
chotomies or clumsy assumptions with which theologians sometimes reinforce and 
deepen their dogmatic trenches.
Bethany Sollereder catalogues in her essay three schools within Christian theodicy: 
classical, practical, and anti- theodical. Using psychological studies of resilience in pain, 
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she introduces what she calls “compassionate theodicy.” Sollereder argues that none 
of the former three schools pay sufficient attention to the person in pain, not even anti- 
theodicists like Kenneth Surin, Terrence Tilley, and Dorothee Sölle who see classical 
theodicy as a dalliance by leisured philosophers who write just- so stories that silence 
the voices of sufferers.
Our final grouping of articles is called Plants and Animals. Mikael Leidenhag ar-
gues that biological teleology, long derided by adherents of the “Religion and Science” 
conflict myth, is in fact another entangled concept. Using new research in the field of 
organismic biology— a field in which researchers do not shy away from questions of 
teleology— Leidenhag contends that theologians ought to affirm what he calls “intrin-
sic teleology.” He points to ways that this concept is already crucial to some Catholic, 
Protestant, and Orthodox doctrines.
Alexander Massmann’s article brings together different theological schools of thought 
on the question of grace. Modern Theology has previously played a part in enriching this 
debate with perspectives rooted in the Anglo- Catholic tradition, enlivening the discus-
sion with observations about reciprocal gift- giving in cultural anthropology. Massmann 
extends the discussion between disciplines by drawing on the biological study of ani-
mal behavior. Christians appear to agree that God’s salvation is a gift, but what is a gift 
in the first place? Should sola gratia mean what it was taken to mean in, say, sixteenth- 
century Wittenberg or Geneva? Despite important differences, there are nonetheless 
significant similarities in how human beings and non- human animals engage in recip-
rocal exchanges. From a theological perspective, that says something important about 
creation. Yet Massmann’s article does not impose the logic of empirical studies onto 
theology, as if academic disciplines were involved in a tug- of- war with one pulling the 
other into its own territory. Theologians, particularly those in the Protestant tradition, 
may not only learn something helpful in this discussion, but Protestantism also has its 
own contribution to make to the larger theological debate about reciprocity and gift.
Matthew Whelan offers a fascinating study of insects. As a theologian also trained in 
agroecology, a scientific field that incorporates principles governing natural ecosystems, 
Whelan argues that these principles operate somewhat like natural law does. Catholic 
social teaching, of course, draws on natural law and Whelan develops several parallels 
between agroecology and social teaching on this basis. Nonetheless, this leaves social 
teaching with a puzzle. Like agroecology, Catholic social teaching’s account of natural 
law appeals to a natural- ecological order with principles for tilling and keeping. But 
it overlooks the entanglement of that appeal with empirical claims about the world, 
as well as its practical implications for agriculture. One consequence is that Catholic 
social teaching fails to deal adequately with the constitutive role of death in the natural 
order. Hoping to help social teaching, and all of us, out of the puzzle, Whelan turns 
to biological control, an agroecological approach to the management of insect herbi-
vores (“pests”), as well as the agricultural practices of the Cakchiquel people of the 
Guatemalan highlands.
We close with Daniel Pedersen’s essay as a kind of book end to the opening article 
by Davison. We noted that Davison fits somewhere between the streams of theology- 
engaged science and science- engaged theology. Pedersen’s theological puzzle, by con-
trast, is a forceful, doctrinal challenge. If primatologists are right in one of their relatively 
well- established findings (i.e., evolved dispositions), does it undermine the justice of 
8 John Perry and Joanna Leidenhag
© 2021The Authors. Modern Theology published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd
damnation? Pedersen suspects that it does. Along the way, he refers to some of the same 
sources on free will that Visala introduced in his article.
As a sort of coda to this special issue, we invited Peter Harrison, Jonathan Jong, and 
Carmody Grey to provide a set of outsiders’ replies from the disciplines of history, 
science, and systematic theology respectively. Since Harrison’s work has been so in-
fluential to our thinking, we were interested in learning whether the content of our 
special issue is concordant with his image of theology. A second voice is that of Jonathan 
Jong— an experimental psychologist, originally from Malaysia— whose work engages 
with traditionally spiritual topics (e.g., mortality). He is also an Anglican priest. Since 
Jong has previously criticized theologians for sometimes misusing scientific studies to 
make religious associations, we invited him to scrutinize these articles. Our final voice 
is that of Carmody Grey, a Roman Catholic theologian who has examined the intersec-
tion between Radical Orthodoxy and the life sciences. We asked her to hold us account-
able in our embrace of theology’s “new boldness.”
In writing this introduction, and consequently rereading the submissions, we noticed 
four recurring hallmarks of successful theological puzzles in science- engaged theology, 
that is, four ways to use empirical findings as a source for theology without falling into 
some of the pitfalls that Harrison identified. First and above all, in science- engaged the-
ology, the relevant disciplines are not “Science and Religion,” so- called, but biology and 
liturgy, or ecology and stewardship, etc. The more specific we can get about the theo-
logical doctrine and the scientific theory or study, the better. A good example is Tanton, 
whose article does not propose to “have a conversation between science and theology.” 
He simply argues that to answer a theological question— what does the doctrine of 
 divine accommodation mean?— he needs to know a bit of cognitive science.
Second, the authors of these articles largely consider products of the subdisciplines as 
tools by which we can (imperfectly and partially) garner understanding. Third, there are 
many different ways to do theology, including different approaches to science- engaged 
theology. In all of them, the most successful inquiries occur when theologians are up-
front about the questions they ask. Above, we intentionally used the word “puzzles.” 
Everyone knows what it is to solve a puzzle— or to fail to solve it. We should aspire 
to be similarly upfront in theology, never stating our goal vaguely and imprecisely as 
“doing theology.”
This is something that Sollereder exemplifies in her article on theodicy. She poses 
two specific, generative, theological questions: “Is there a logical contradiction between 
God’s omnipotence and goodness and the presence of suffering?” and “What is the best 
way to help a Christian parent grieve her lost child?” But in taking them together she 
shows that a sound answer to each question differs in important ways. Trying to solve 
the second (helping the parent) with an appropriate answer for the first (clarifying the 
possible contradiction), and vice versa, results in confusion. To be sure, there are lots of 
legitimate forms of theological inquiry. What matters crucially, however, is ensuring 
that our success conditions match our mode of inquiry.
Fourth, at least half of our articles focus on particular terms, which we have called 
“entangled concepts.” By describing concepts thus, we do not mean merely to point 
out a significant semantic overlap, as we once saw promoted on a book’s back cover: 
Recent theology and quantum physics show that relationality is key! This approach seems to 
imagine that the key term, “relationality,” is self- evident and univocal. But nor should 
we overreact and assume equivocity, that theology and quantum mechanics can a priori 
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have nothing to do with one another. Instead, the language of relationality has a history 
in which the study of God and the study of creation have played a part and continue 
to do so. The meaning of such concepts within the various subdisciplines can therefore 
neither be assumed to be the same, nor assumed to be understood as if they operated 
in a sanitized separation from one another; instead, such concepts intermingle and in-
teract, requiring careful investigation into both disciplines in order to fully understand 
their meanings.
Throughout this special issue, we have aspired to fulfill one of the hopes for the future 
of Modern Theology— a hope identified by a former editor of the journal, James Buckley:
I am not sure that Modern Theology has done as well with two of Surin’s other prom-
ises; namely, conversation and debate over theology in relation to “culture” . . . and 
in relation to “natural sciences.” I know there have been articles on these. More 
importantly, many articles have used “arts” and “sciences” in the course of advanc-
ing arguments about sundry theological topics. But I would have to read or re- read 
such articles to develop a clearer profile of what the conversation and debate looks 
like in Modern Theology. This will be an important topic for the future.12
It may seem presumptuous to claim that the future is here, but we are convinced that there 
are some grounds for thinking that the set of essays that follows marks an important, if 
modest, contribution to doing theology with new boldness— which has been a hallmark of 
Modern Theology from its inception.13
12 James J. Buckley, “Ruminations on Modern Theology,” Modern Theology 26, no. 1 (December 2009): 23.
13 Our thanks to the current editors of Modern Theology, Jim Fodor and William Cavanaugh, for their sup-
port, as well as to Jon Kelly and Micah Perry for research and editorial assistance.
